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ABSTRACT
This article examines private standards that aim to mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions in shipping. These have emerged against a backdrop of regulatory inertia
and the exclusion of international shipping from the Paris Climate Change Agreement.
They are a product of complex governance arrangements and they have addressed
areas of market failure that have held back fuel efﬁciency advances that are made pos-
sible by technological innovations. These private standards hold considerable promise
but suffer to different degrees from certain weaknesses, notably a lack of transparency,
a low level of ambition and concerns about data reliability. This article examines these
deﬁciencies together with the reasons for them, and assesses the role that law could
play in addressing them. It argues that the conditions may be present for the mitigation
of shipping’s GHG emissions to become a site of ‘hybrid’ governance, combining pri-
vate standards and state/supra-state law in a productive way.
KEYWORDS : Climate change, international shipping, private standards, EU-MRV,
meta-regulation
1. INTRODUCTION
This article looks at the recent development of a series of private greenhouse gas
(GHG) emission standards in the global shipping industry in the context of the pro-
found decarbonisation challenge faced by this sector. These arise out of complex
governance arrangements based on fluid partnerships between industry, non-
governmental orgnisations (NGOs), climate change philanthropy organisations and
academic institutions. They have addressed areas of market failure that have held
back fuel efficiency advances that are made possible by technological innovations.
The emergence of private GHG emission reduction standards in shipping holds
considerable promise and these standards have been enthusiastically, if unevenly
taken up. Nonetheless, and to different degrees these standards are characterised by
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a number of weaknesses: namely a lack of transparency, a low level of ambition and
concerns about data reliability.
In this article, we exemplify these weaknesses by looking at a range of different
private standards that aim to reduce GHG emissions in shipping. Drawing upon an
analytical framework developed by Mattli and Woods,1 we examine the context in
which these standards have emerged with a view to understanding better why they
suffer from these weaknesses. We find that the bodies that promulgate these stand-
ards are relatively closed and heavily dominated by industry. Moreover, their ac-
countability mechanisms tend to be ad hoc rather than integrated into their routine
operation.
We also find that the demand for private standards in this area is relatively nar-
rowly focused. Demand is driven in the main by ‘corporate consumers’ who have an
interest in promoting energy efficiency to lower the cost of shipping services by
reducing the amount of fuel that is used in the transportation of goods. This narrow
focus stands in contrast to other areas of shipping regulation where demand for regu-
lation has been driven by a broad coalition of actors including NGOs and ‘corpor-
ations at risk’.2 One consequence of this narrow focus is that private standards place
emphasis upon improving energy efficiency and realising a reduction in the GHG
emissions intensity of shipping. At the same time, it operates to distract attention
from the scale of the shipping sector’s absolute or cumulative emissions.
Recently, however, there have been calls within the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) to establish a cumulative emissions target for shipping. In 2016,
the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) proposed the establishment of an
‘Intended Nationally Determined Contribution’ (INDC) for shipping. This interven-
tion reflects the fears of some within the industry that unless the IMO acts (or at
least appears to be acting), the exclusion of international shipping from the Paris
Agreement on Climate Change will lead to a proliferation of ‘regional’ GHG stand-
ards. The IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee has agreed to establish
a Working Group to develop a work plan and timetable to define the shipping sec-
tor’s ‘fair share’ of GHG emissions with a view to censuring that the sector makes its
fair contribution to achieving the Paris’s Agreements ambitious climate change
goals.3
We argue that the adoption by the IMO of a cumulative emissions target for ship-
ping would be highly significant. One consequence of this would be that the actions
of any one emitter would have implications for all other emitters in the shipping sec-
tor as they would all be eating from the same finite emissions pie. This would create
interdependence between emitters. There is evidence from other areas of shipping
regulation to suggest that such interdependence can generate pressure for more ef-
fective private standards and for more robust forms of industry-wide peer-to-peer re-
view of compliance with them.
1 Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods, ‘Whose Benefit: Explaining Regulatory Change in World Politics’ in
Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods (eds), The Politics of Global Regulation (Princeton UP 2009).
2 The terms ‘corporate consumers’ and ‘corporations at risk’ are taken from ibid.
3 IMO, ‘Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its Sixth-Ninth Session’ (MEPC 69/
21, para 7.7(7)). See also (n 137). Note also the results of MEPC70 in October 2016 which agreed on a
roadmap towards the development of a strategy on the reduction of GHG emissions from ships.
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Industry fears about the emergence of a patchwork of regional regulation have
been fuelled by the actions of the European Union (EU). Although the EU has so
far stopped short of including international shipping within its emissions trading
scheme, it has adopted a Regulation on the monitoring, reporting and verification of
carbon dioxide emissions from maritime transport (EU–MRV). 4
We argue that EU–MRV has the potential to shape private standards in two im-
portant ways. First, by making the GHG emissions data of vessels calling at EU
ports publicly available, it will go some way in offsetting the lack of transparency
that characterises many private standards. The EU data will not only be available to
those who purchase shipping services, but also to regulators and campaigning
NGOs. Secondly, and more tentatively, we argue that EU–MRV presents the EU
with an opportunity to assume the role of a meta-regulator, by using EU–MRV as a
resource to create incentives for private standard-setting bodies to comply with EU
governance requirements. Here, we draw inspiration from EU regulation of biofuels
where recognition of private standard-setting bodies by the EU is conditional upon
their demonstrating compliance with EU requirements relating to transparency and
data reliability. We argue that a meta-regulatory approach to EU–MRV could
empower the EU vis-a-vis private standard-setting bodies and create space for po-
tentially fruitful industry experimentation in the design of cost-effective systems of
MRV.
In short, this article identifies the promise and the limits of private standards to
reduce GHG emissions from shipping, sheds light on why more robust standards
have not emerged and considers different ways in which these standards could be im-
proved as a result of their interaction with law.
This article begins by explaining the scale of the shipping sector’s decarbonisation
challenge and provides a brief overview of existing regulatory responses to this (sec-
tion 2). It proceeds to introduce the concept and promise of private standards (sec-
tion 3) and to identify the most important private standards that aim to mitigate
GHG emissions from shipping and to explore their potential (section 3). Before con-
cluding (section 8), the article examines the deficiencies inherent in private standards
(section 5), assesses the reasons for these (section 6) and explores the relationship
between private standards and law (section 7).
2. TACKLING GHG EMISSIONS FROM SHIPPING: THE SHIPPING
SECTOR’S GHG EMISSIONS GAP
There is a substantial distance—the so-called ‘emissions gap’— between the interna-
tional community’s commitment to contain the increase in global temperature to
well below 2 degrees Celsius (2 C) and the volume of current and projected GHG
emissions.5 Not surprisingly, the shipping sector’s 70,000 vessels contribute to the
4 Parliament and Council Reg 2015/757 of 29 April 2015 on the monitoring, reporting and verification of
carbon dioxide emissions from maritime transport [2015] OJ L123/55.
5 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), The Emissions Gap Report 2015 (UNEP 2015). Even if
the 6 gigatonnes of emission reductions included in countries [I]NDCs are respected, a further 12 giga-
tonnes of reductions will be required.
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existence of this ‘emissions gap’.6 Global GHGs from shipping are calculated as
around 2–3% of the total anthropogenic GHG emissions over the last decade, and
are projected to rise above current levels by between 50% and 250% by 2050. For
the shipping sector to contribute in equal proportion to other sectors to ensure a
50% probability of attaining the 2 C limit to global temperature rises, shipping emis-
sions must be reduced by 50% by 2050 and reach zero emissions by 2080.7
Clearly the production of GHGs by ships is a by-product of their primary function
of servicing the global economy by transporting goods. Fuel costs account for 25 to
50% of total costs in shipping and represent the single largest ‘cost position’ in the
industry.8 There are, therefore, clear economic incentives to reduce fuel use in ship-
ping. This could have the happy co-benefit of reducing GHG emissions as well.
However, the apparently simple win–win benefit of increasing the efficiency of
fuel use in shipping is attenuated by the particular commercial arrangements of the
shipping industry and, in particular, the market barriers that stand in the way of
achieving improvements in energy efficiency.9 Here, the lack of reliable information
of various sorts is key10. The shipping sector is also characterised by the high level of
asymmetric information that contracting parties hold. In some cases, ship owners
may have the incentive to misrepresent the fuel efficiency of their ship to a potential
charterer.11 Therefore in the absence of reliable data, it is difficult for those purchas-
ing shipping services, such as cargo owners or charterers, to integrate energy effi-
ciency considerations into the procurement decisions that they make. They either do
not have the information which they would need to distinguish between efficient and
inefficient ships or they cannot trust this information.
There is also a lack of capital available to invest in fuel efficiency improvements
on existing ships.12 This is partly because of the existence of a split incentive problem
in shipping. While ship owners generally bear the cost of achieving technological im-
provements, it is those who charter ships who will generally reap the fuel savings that
are achieved, unless ship owners can recoup their investments through higher charter
rates.13 The split incentive is also a function of shipping markets exposure to time
charters and the length of time charters.
It is also difficult for those selling fuel efficiency retrofits to make a business case
in favour of energy efficiency in the absence of reliable data about the fuel savings
6 Tristian Smith and others, CO2 Targets, Trajectories and Trends for International Shipping (Shipping in
Changing Climates 2015). <https://www.bartlett.ucl.ac.uk/energy/publications/co2-targets-trajectories-
and-trends-for-international-shipping> accessed 15 September 2016.
7 This is relative to a 2012 baseline.
8 DNV-GL, Maritime Energy Management Study 2015: Energy Efficient Operation – What Really Matters’
(DNV-GL 2015) 8.
9 Victoria Stulgis and others, Hidden Treasure: Financial Models for Retrofits (Carbon War Room, & UCL
Energy Institute 2014) 6.
10 Nishatabbas Rehmatulla and Tristan Smith, ‘Barriers to Energy Efficiency in Shipping: A Triangulated
Approach to Investigate the Principal Agent Problem in Shipping’ (2015) 84 Energy Policy 44.
11 Albert Veenstra and Jan van Dalen, ‘Ship Speed and Fuel Consumption Quotation in Ocean Shipping
Time Charter Contracts’ (2011) 45 Journal of Transport Economics and Policy 41.
12 Nishatabbas Rehmatulla and Tristan Smith, ‘Barriers to Energy Efficient and Low Carbon Shipping’
(2011) 110 Ocean Engineering 102.
13 On average only 40% of the financial savings delivered by energy efficiency accrue to the ship owner for
the period 2008–12 in the drybulk Panamax sector.
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and other economic benefits that technological improvements of different kinds will
produce.14 This is because historically fuel consumption in shipping has been in the
form of low frequency data (one observation every day)15 and the wide variety of
operating conditions experienced by a ship makes performance analysis difficult.
Even if these barriers can be overcome, there is still no guarantee that this will suf-
fice to close the shipping sector’s projected emissions gap. This is because even sub-
stantial improvements in energy efficiency may not bring about a (sufficient)
reduction in the cumulative emissions generated by the shipping sector.16 This is due
to expectations of rising transport demand. The transport demand scenarios included
in the Third IMO GHG Study posit the possibility of a 4-fold increase in transport
demand during in the years 2012–50.17
The regulatory response to the challenge of reducing the shipping sector’s GHG
emissions has been disappointing. While the Kyoto Protocol delegated responsibility
for regulating shipping emissions to the IMO,18 shipping is nowhere mentioned in
the Paris Agreement on Climate Change.19 Although the EU pushed hard for its in-
clusion, there was strong opposition from within the Group of G77 countries. This
opposition was driven in significant part by disagreements between developed and
developing countries about the status and implications of the principle of common
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR) in international
shipping.20
The 2015 Paris climate negotiations prompted the expression of different pos-
itions from within the shipping industry. While some argued that the exclusion of
international shipping from the text of the climate change agreement would send a
clear signal that the IMO is the appropriate forum for the pursuit of emission reduc-
tions in shipping, others were critical of the decision to exclude shipping, fearing that
this might lead to a rise in regional (EU) regulation.21 Given the strength of the
14 Nishatabbas Rehmatulla and others, ‘Wind Technologies: Opportunities and Barriers to a Low Carbon
Shipping Industry’ (2016) 70 Marine Policy 1.
15 L Aldous and others, ‘Uncertainty Analysis in Ship Performance Monitoring’ (2015) 110 Ocean
Engineering 29.
16 See Kevin Anderson and Alice Bows, ‘Executing a Scharnow turn: Reconciling Shipping Emissions with
International Commitments on Climate change’ (2012) 3 Carbon Management 615.
17 These demand scenario (relating to containers, dry bulkers and tankers) are represented in Figure 3 of
Smith and others (n 6).
18 art 2.2 of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change 2303 UNTS 148
(1997). The IMO is the UN specialised agency with responsibility for the safety and security of shipping
and the prevention of maritime pollution by ships.
19 The implication of this is that parties are not required to include GHG emissions from international ship-
ping in their national GHG emission inventories.
20 For a detailed discussion see Sophia Kopela, ‘Climate Change, Regime Interaction and the Principle of
Common but Differentiated Responsibility: The Experience of the International Maritime Organization’
(2013) 24 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 70.
21 The International Chamber of Shipping adopted the former position, while the latter viewpoint was
espoused by a group of large ship-owners including Maersk and the Danish Shipowners’ Association. Jane
Lister, Rene Taudal Poulsen and Stefano Ponte, ‘Orchestrating Transnational Environmental Governance
in Maritime Shipping’ (2015) 34 Global Environmental Change 185 observe the tendency of ‘major ship-
ping companies [to form] alliances to encourage regulation’, particularly with a view to ensuring uniform,
global rules (190). They also stress, however, the more general tendency of the shipping industry to
adopt rhetorically progressive positions whilst lobbying against regulation.
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disagreements between countries and within the shipping sector, it is not surprising
that the negotiators ultimately took the decision to exclude international shipping
from the text of the final agreement.
The IMO’s main response to the shipping emissions gap occurred in 2011,22 when
it introduced a Mandatory Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) for new ships and
required all ships to have a Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP).23
These regulations were adopted by adding a new chapter to Annex VI of the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL).
While the IMO is to be commended for securing their introduction, they are expected
to fall considerably short in their ability to close the shipping sector’s GHG emissions
gap.24 Indeed, the projected rise in shipping’s GHG emissions (50–250% by 2050) al-
ready takes the implementation of these regulations into account.
The inability of these regulations to deliver emission reductions on a scale that is
commensurate with the shipping sector’s decarbonisation challenge is in significant
part because the IMO’s EEDI regulations only apply to new ships built after 2013
and are concerned exclusively with a ship’s design efficiency and not with its oper-
ational efficiency. It is estimated that only 15% of the fleet will be subject to EEDI by
2020. In contrast, although the SEEMP is concerned with a ship’s operational effi-
ciency, it does not require any specific outcomes in terms of energy efficiency im-
provements and realisation of energy efficiency improvements will be impeded by
the market barriers identified above.
Hence, as things stand, neither the functioning of the market nor the instruments
adopted by the IMO will serve to ensure that the shipping sector makes a propor-
tionate contribution to achieving the international community’s ‘well below 2 C’ cli-
mate change mitigation goal. It is in view of this shortfall that we turn to consider
the potential for private standards to contribute to the attainment of this goal.
3. THE CONCEPT OF PRIVATE STANDARDS
Abbott and Snidal coined the expression ‘regulatory standard-setting’ to describe a
new mode of transnational regulation which has proliferated rapidly during the last
two decades.25 According to their use of this term, regulatory standard-setting occurs
when voluntary standards are adopted (principally) by non-state actors such as firms
and/or NGOs. These voluntary norms are intended to facilitate technical coordin-
ation through standardisation and address social and environmental externalities
such as climate change. We characterise voluntary standards adopted by non-state
actors as ‘private standards’.
22 IMO Resolution MEPC.203(62), ‘Amendments of the Annex to the Protocol of 1997 to Amend the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of Ships 1973 (Inclusion of regulations on en-
ergy efficiency for ships in MARPOL Annex VI)’ <http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/
GHG/Documents/eedi%20amendments%20RESOLUTION%20MEPC203%2062.pdf> accessed 15
September 2016.
23 ibid, Reg 19-21 on EEDI and Reg 22 on SEEMP. These measures apply to ships of 400GT and over.
24 Anderson and Bows (n 16) and Smith and others (n 6).
25 Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and
the Shadow of the State’ in Mattli and Woods (n 1).
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Private standards are now so widespread that their existence has been recognized
by the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO’s Technical Barriers to Trade
Agreement (TBT Agreement) distinguishes between regulations and standards.26
While compliance with ‘regulations’ is mandatory, compliance with ‘standards’ is vol-
untary. Drawing on this definition, as well as upon discussions on private standards
in the WTO’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Committee,27 we conceive pri-
vate standards as written documents adopted by a non-governmental entity which
lay down rules, guidelines and/or characteristics, for common or repeated use, for
products or related processes and production methods, including transport.
Compliance with private standards is not mandated by law and such standards may
deal exclusively with labelling or designation.
Maritime transport has been a rich source of evidence and examples for scholars
exploring the role of private standards in transnational governance.28 Furger offers
an overview of private standards in maritime transport, focusing on the activities of
ship classification societies, marine underwriters and P&I clubs.29 He argues that the
maritime industry has ‘displayed a surprising ability to address its own institutional
failures’ in regulating issues of ship safety and the protection of the environment, par-
ticularly from oil spills.30 He highlights the peer review function that is played by dif-
ferent standard-setting bodies, with the marine insurers’ Salvage Association and P&I
clubs informally reviewing the adequacy of the surveys conducted by ship classifica-
tion societies.31 He also places emphasis upon the positive role played by industry-
wide associations that serve to temper competition with cooperation by adopting
private standards that serve as membership access rules.32
More detailed studies provide evidence of the positive impact of private standards
on ship survival.33 These suggest that ship inspections undertaken by industry have
been as effective in increasing the probability of ship survival as inspections that are
undertaken by state authorities pursuant to port state control.34 While the layering
of additional types of inspections generates a diminishing return in prolonging ship
26 World Trade Organisation Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, 1868 UNTS (1994), Annex 1.1
(regulations) and 1.2 (standards).
27 SPS Committee, ‘Report of the Co-Stewards of the Private Standards E-Working Group on Action I’ G/
SPS/W/276 (18 March 2014) paras 8 and 9.
28 For just one of many examples see, A Claire Cutler, ‘Private Authority in International Trade Relations:
The Case of Maritime Transport’ in A Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler and Tony Porter (eds), Private
Authority and International Affairs (State University of New York Press 1999).
29 Franco Furger, ‘Accountability and Systems of Self-Governance: The Case of the Marine Industry’
(2002) 19 Law & Policy 445. Classification societies ‘class’ or certify ships as being in conformity with
the standards that they draw up. Acting as recognised organisations, they also certify compliance with na-
tional and international regulations on behalf of flag states. P&I clubs (Protection and Indemnity Clubs)
are non-profit, mutual insurance associations that provide cover for third-party liabilities.
30 ibid 465.
31 ibid 458, 462.
32 ibid, 465–67. He argues that the International Union of Marine Insurers has only been ‘marginally suc-
cessful in addressing issues of common concern’ (467).
33 See Govert Bijwaard and Sabine Knapp, ‘Analysis of Ship Life Cycles – The Impact of Economic Cycles
and Ship Inspections’ (2009) 33 Marine Policy 350.
34 ibid 361–63. By contrast ISM audits are not found to decrease the incident rate for most ship types.
Reducing GHG Emissions from Shipping  7
survival, even industry inspections that are additional to port state control inspections
decrease the risk of accidents for ships.35
4. THE EXISTENCE AND POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION OF PRIVATE
STANDRDES IN REDUCING GHG EMISSIONS FROM SHIPPING
While private standards lack the ‘command and control’ quality of much state-based
environmental law, there is evidence that they are being developed to reduce social
and environmental externalities.36 There has been a proliferation of private standards
in the area of climate change.37 Abbott has identified more than fifty climate change
initiatives that are led by civil society organisations and/or firms.38 As Abbott himself
acknowledges, his list is not intended to be exhaustive and indeed it does not include
any one of the shipping specific examples that are set out in Table 1 further.
It is our contention that private standards in shipping have the potential to help
overcome the market barriers that impede energy efficiency improvements in ship-
ping. This potential exists due to the ability of these standards to increase the avail-
ability of relevant information, to inculcate procedures within companies for
identifying and exploiting opportunities for reducing GHG emissions from shipping,
and by increasing the availability of capital for fuel efficiency retrofits by providing
Table 1 Private standards governing GHG emissions from shipping
Type of private standard Prominent examples
MRV (other than when incorporated in ship rating
scheme)
DAMCO CarbonCheck
OCIMF CO2 Trajectory
Prediction Model
Environmental management system (EMS) (other than
when incorporated in ship rating scheme)
DAMCO CarbonDashboard
Ship rating schemes CCWG
CSI
RightShip/Carbon War Room
GHG emissions rating
ESI
DNV-Triple E
Green Award
Ship Finance Standards Efﬁcient Ship Finance
(with Liberian Ship Registry)
35 ibid 363. However, the authors do conclude that too many inspections are performed on ships, particu-
larly tankers, and call for better coordination of inspection efforts.
36 See David Vogel, ‘The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct’ in Mattli and Woods (n 1).
37 Kenneth Abbott, ‘The Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change’ (2012) 30 Enviornment and
Planning C Government Policy 571.
38 ibid 575–77.
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information and alleviating the split incentive problem in shipping. The impact of
these and other private standards will depend also upon the ability of supply-side
‘norm entrepreneurs’ to persuade stakeholders in the shipping sector to implement
these standards and to use the information that they generate in their decision-mak-
ing.39 These different pathways to influence for private standards are explored further
below. Table 1 identifies what we consider to be the most important private stand-
ards that aim to GHG emissions from shipping.40
The standards listed in Table 1 meet the definition of private standards provided
above. While there is rich variation among these, they all comprise written docu-
ments containing rules, guidelines or characteristics for repeated use in respect of
GHG emissions generated in the transportation of products by sea. The require-
ments set out by the private standards are frequently process oriented, in that they
prescribe appropriate conduct rather than require a specific outcome; for example,
they may prescribe a methodology for measuring GHG emissions or the steps that
should be taken within companies to identify opportunities to reduce GHG emis-
sions. While some of the ship rating schemes are purely procedural in orientation
(Green Award and DNV-Triple E), others rate or rank vessels according to their
level of GHG emissions. These latter schemes embody a substantive standard in that
a specified level of performance must be attained to achieve a particular rating (eg an
‘A’ rating), which may be viewed as a label or designation within our definition of
private standards above. Thus, where ratings or performance indicators are de-
veloped to provide a short-hand method of communicating compliance (or a degree
of compliance) with private standards, we view these ratings or performance indica-
tors as forming a component of the broader concept of private standards.41 We now
turn to consider the different pathways to influence for private standards that aim to
reduce GHG emissions from shipping.
4.1 Increasing the Availability of Information
All of the private standards included in Table 1 serve to generate information about
the fuel efficiency/GHG emissions of vessels. Where this information is made avail-
able, it permits comparisons to be drawn between more or less polluting vessels. We
see a clear example of information about a vessel’s GHG emissions being used by
those chartering shipping services in the context of RightShip/Carbon War Room’s
(RightShip) GHG Emissions Rating.42 RightShip was set up in 2001 by the
39 While we highlight the role of supply-side ‘norm entrepreneurs’ in this section of the article, we return in
section 5 to consider demand-side entrepreneurs.
40 Only measures that go further than existing governmental or international regulations are included as pri-
vate standards here. We reached the conclusion that these are the most important standards following dis-
cussion with shipping industry stakeholders present at the Stakeholder Workshop on ‘Reducing
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Shipping’ that was convened by the UCL-based members of the
Shipping in Changing Climates project at the Royal Society in London on 28th August 2015.
41 For a discussion of the relationship between standards and indicators see Kevin Davies, Benedict
Kingsbury and Sally Engle Merry, ‘Indicators as a Technology of Global Governance’ (2012) 46 Law and
Society Review 71. While these authors accept that indicators ‘embody’ broad standards (eg good govern-
ance) we suggest here that standards may also embody indicators.
42 For an overview of the RightShip GHG Emissions Rating see: <http://site.rightship.com/services/ghg-
emissions-rating/> accessed 17 September 2016.
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commodity companies (and ship charterers) BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto, with
Cargill joining as an equity partner in 2006. RightShip has developed an Existing
Vessel Design Index (EVDI) which uses a ship’s design to estimate its CO2 emis-
sions per nautical mile. Depending upon a ship’s performance based on the EVDI
relative to the average of ships of a similar size and type, RightShip assigns an A-G
energy efficiency rating to that ship. More than two dozen large corporations cur-
rently use this ship rating scheme to avoid chartering the least efficient vessels (F
and G rated). It has been reported that RightShip’s GHG Emissions Rating is shift-
ing 20% of global shipped tonnage away from the least efficient vessels, resulting in
average emissions savings of between 5% and 9%.43
The information generated by private standards is also available for use by other
shipping stakeholders. For example, the Environmental Ship Index (ESI) forms part
of the World Ports Climate Initiative.44 It aims to provide information about vessels’
airborne emissions and includes a reporting scheme on GHG emissions (as will be
seen, GHG emissions currently form only a very small part of this). This information
is intended for use by ports to reward participating ships as well as by shipping com-
panies themselves. Forty port authorities, situated in seventeen different countries,
currently offer economic incentives to vessels that participate in this scheme.45 For
example, the Port of Oslo offers a 40% rebate on port dues for ships that achieve an
ESI score of at least 50 (the maximum possible score is 100). Further, it has been
claimed that leading banks in the shipping industry, including HSH Nordbank and
KfW IPE-Bank, are using the data generated by private standards to assess invest-
ment risk and return, with inefficient vessels being regarded as a higher-risk
investment.46
4.2 Improving Companies’ Internal Procedures for Measuring and
Mitigating GHG Emissions
Some of the private standards identified in Table 1 aim to secure positive change by
bringing about an improvement in companies’ internal procedures to increase aware-
ness about the importance of reducing GHG emissions and the means by which this
can be achieved. ‘Management-based’ standards of this kind use procedural interven-
tions in a bid to promote attainment of a substantive goal.47
The ‘Triple-E’ vessel rating scheme developed by the Norwegian ship classifica-
tion society DNV GL offers a good example in this respect. This aims to improve a
company’s organisational performance, to identify ways of minimising environmental
43 As reported by participant at Stakeholder Workshop (n 40).
44 For details of ESI see <http://www.environmentalshipindex.org/Public/Home> accessed 17 September
2016.
45 For a list see <http://esi.wpci.nl/Public/PortIPs> accessed 17 September 2016. A number of ports also
use RightShip’s GHG emissions rating to offer incentives to the most efficient vessels.
46 CWR, ‘Higher Revenue Potential Drives Use of Energy Efficiency Data by Leading Shipping Banks’
(CWR 26 May 2015) <http://www.shippingefficiency.org/sites/shippingefficiency.org/files/press/files/
CWR_eshot_shipping_KFWNordbank_FINALd4.pdf> accessed 17 September 2016.
47 Cary Coglianese and David Lazer, ‘Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to
Achieve Public Goals’ (2003) 37 Law and Society Review 691.
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impact, and to optimise fuel consumption thereby reducing cost. Under this scheme,
the rating achieved by a particular vessel will depend in significant part upon a com-
pany’s internal management procedures.48 Subject to complying with mandatory
regulations (such as the IMO’s EEDI for new ships), the attainment of a particular
rating does not depend upon substantive targets being met. To achieve a top rating
(Level 1 of 4 possible levels), a company must implement a certified environmental
management system, make use of an Energy Efficiency Operational Indicator
(EEOI) to document performance and carry out an environmental risk assessment
as well as environmental training of management and crew.
DAMCO’s CarbonDashboard offers another example of a management-based ap-
proach to securing GHG emission reductions.49 This is intended to assist companies
to calculate their supply-chain emissions and to increase their capacity to identify
and address carbon ‘hot spots’ within it. One DAMCO customer is said to have
achieved a 40% reduction in its supply-chain CO2 emissions by using the
CarbonDashboard tools.50
4.3 Increasing the Availability of Capital by Mitigating the Split Incentive
Problem
As was noted above, split incentives constitute a significant market barrier to achiev-
ing energy efficiency in shipping. These arise where the party which is responsible
for investing in energy efficiency (the ship owner) is not the party which will reap
the financial return (the charterer).
We are, however, starting to see the emergence of private standards that are in-
tended to remove this split incentive barrier, thereby unlocking additional capital for
investment in energy efficiency improvements on ships. A US company called
Efficient Ship Finance (ESF) has an innovative system for financing large-scale fuel
efficiency retrofits on existing ships. Crucially, this system does not require up-front
or on-balance sheet investment by ship owners.51 ESF makes the up-front invest-
ment and recoups the cost of this by claiming a share of the additional revenues that
are generated as a result of it. The expectation is that additional revenues will be gen-
erated as a result of lower fuel costs, increased charter rates, greater fleet utilization
and higher resale value of vessels among other things. As things stand, take-up of
ESF finance appears to be curtailed by the high cost of the finance provided and the
rapid decline in the cost of fuel.
ESF’s innovative financing model has required the development of private stand-
ards for measuring energy efficiency improvements and for quantifying the economic
return that flows from these. It has also required the development of methodologies
48 To the extent that Triple-E scheme does lay down substantive requirements, these do not go further than
existing, binding regulations.
49 For an overview, see DAMCO, ‘Ecologics CarbonDashboard: End-to-End Carbon Visibility and
Management’ <http://www.damco.com/en/our-services/supply-chain-design-and-optimisation//media/
430b5be85d25404892bd36d50d0e4dad> accessed 1 October 2016.
50 As reported by participant at Stakeholder Workshop (n 40).
51 This builds on a model first developed at UCL Energy Institute in collaboration with the Carbon War
Room (n 9).
Reducing GHG Emissions from Shipping  11
for dividing up the financial returns flowing from investments between ESF and the
owner and operator of an ESF-retrofitted ship.
Additionally, the very fact that a vessel has undergone ESF-financed fuel efficiency
retrofits is now being used as a standard by the Liberian shipping registry as a bench-
mark for awarding significant tonnage tax discounts to ship owners.52 This, and fu-
ture rises in fuel costs, may create an incentive for future take-up of ESF finance.
4.4 The Activities of ‘Norm Entrepreneurs’
The influence of private standards will depend upon the institutional framework
within which they are embedded and upon the capacity of private standard-setting
bodies and others to serve as successful ‘norm entrepreneurs’.53 Here, we treat pri-
vate standards as norms as they meet the generally accepted definition of norms as ‘a
standard of appropriate behavio[u]r for actors with a given identity’.54 Private stand-
ards governing GHG emissions from shipping are often embedded within a ‘thick’
institutional environment which is characterised by the existence of organisations
and networks that are committed to encouraging the take-up of the standards. Their
ability to persuade an adequate number of target actors to make use of the standards
is a critical determinant of the effectiveness of private standards.55 These supply-side
norm entrepreneurs rely principally upon material incentives—such as reductions in
fuel costs or enhancements to reputation—to persuade ship owners and consumers
of shipping services to use these standards.
The ship rating scheme that has had the greatest success in securing take-up is the
Clean Cargo Working Group (CCWG) which covers 80% of global ocean container
capacity by weight. ‘[CCWG] is a global, business-to-business initiative dedicated to
improving the environmental performance of marine container transport.’56 Many
large corporations with immediate name recognition (eg Electrolux, Heineken,
M&S, Nike and IKEA) have already used their metrics and tools to improve environ-
mental performance in the supply-chain.57
The Carbon War Room (CWR) offers another example of a prominent norm
entrepreneur. 58 The CWR is a non-profit organisation founded by Richard Branson
in 2009. It aims to help break down market barriers to capital investment in
52 A 50% discount in the first year and 25% in the next two. See <http://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/
liberian-registry-launches-green-ship-initiative/> accessed 17 September 2016.
53 Martha Finnemore and Katherine Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’ (1992)
52 International Organization 887.
54 ibid 891.
55 Vogel (n 36) identifies this as one of the key factors influencing the success of what he calls ‘civil
regulation’.
56 BSR (CCWG), ‘Complete Overview’ <https://www.bsr.org/collaboration/groups/clean-cargo-working-
group. accessed 8 August 2016. For evidence of RightShip acting as a norm entrepreneur see its promo-
tional films and other features <http://site.rightship.com/services/ghg-emissions-rating/> accessed on
17 September 2016.
57 Angie Farrage-Thibault and Nate Springer, ‘Clean Cargo Working Group: Transparency and
Transformation in Ocean Transport’ (BSR Blog, 6 May 2014) ,https://www.bsr.org/en/our-insights/
blog-view/clean-cargo-working-group-transparency-and-transformation-in-ocean-transpor> accessed 17
September 2016.
58 The Sustainable Shipping Initiative offers another important example. This brings together 17 leading
shipping companies with WWF and Forum for the Future. It provides a compilation of environmentally
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potentially profitable and scalable clean technologies. The CWR launched shipping-
efficiency.org in 2010 to partner with RightShip in the development and promotion
of its GHG Emissions Rating.59
5. EVALUATING PRIVATE STANDARDS FOR REDUCING GHG
EMISSIONS FROM SHIPPING
The previous section argued that private standards have the potential to contribute
to reducing GHG emissions from shipping by helping to overcome the market bar-
riers that stand in the way of achieving energy efficiency improvements in shipping.
This section, by contrast, identifies the principal deficiencies inherent in existing pri-
vate standards. It argues that the effectiveness of these standards will be reduced
when they lack transparency, are imbued with a low level of ambition, and give rise
to concerns about data reliability.
5.1 Limited Transparency
One of the main aims of the private standards listed in Table 1 is to generate reliable
information about vessels’ GHG emissions and to facilitate comparisons between dif-
ferent vessels. The information that is generated has the potential to become
embedded in the decision-making processes of a wide variety of actors. It is, however,
important to be aware that there are specific limits to the transparency of these
standards. These limits can be readily illustrated by reference to one of the most im-
portant and successful of the ship rating schemes, namely the CCWG which was
introduced above.
The CCWG aims to ‘provide reliable year-on-year emissions performance data
from 23 of the world’s leading ocean carriers that represent approximately 80% of
global ocean container capacity’.60 However, this emissions performance data is only
made available to CCWG members and their access is conditional upon their signing
a confidentiality agreement. Membership of the CCWG is restricted to cargo carriers,
cargo owners (shippers) and freight forwarders. Consequently, whilst this informa-
tion is available to members who are chartering shipping services, it is not available
to other kinds of actors such as governments, NGOs, consumers, financiers, share-
holders or ports.
This limited transparency is evident also in the operation of the Clean Shipping
Index (CSI) which is another of the ship rating schemes listed in Table 1.61 Again,
access to information about the environmental footprint of participating ships is only
available to cargo owners and freight forwarders and is similarly conditional upon
their signing a confidentiality agreement.62 However, the CSI has stated that it aims
oriented private standards in shipping and provides online guidance for potential users <http://ssi.bre
nock.com> accessed 1 October 2016.
59 See <http://www.shippingefficiency.org/carbon-war-room-rightship> accessed 17 September 2016.
60 See BSR, ‘Our Accomplishments’ <http://www.bsr.org/files/work/bsr-ci-ccwg.pdf> accessed 17
September 2016.
61 For an overview see Clean Shipping Index, ‘Environmental Opportunities for shipping’ (2015) at:
<http://www.cleanshippingindex.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/CleanShippingIndex-brochure-
2015.pdf> accessed 30 September 2016.
62 Classification societies and ports are not full members but they may gain limited access to information
subject to the approval of shipping companies.
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in the future ‘to increase the transparency in the index and end the need for confi-
dentiality’.63 By contrast, the ship rating schemes developed by RightShip and the
ESI are commendable in that they do grant public access to vessel-level GHG emis-
sions performance data.64
Aside from restrictions on access to aggregate and disaggregated GHG emissions
performance data, there is little information about the contribution that private
standards make to reducing GHG emissions from shipping.65 Unsurprisingly, this is
particularly the case in respect of process-based management standards which do not
set substantive standards or goals. Many generic claims are made about the excel-
lence of these standards and about their success in encouraging users to achieve re-
ductions in their GHG emissions. However, concrete examples of progress are rare
and quantitative evidence of the GHG emissions reductions achieved by private
standards is virtually impossible to find.66 This is true even in relation to ship rating
schemes.
The CCWG makes greater efforts than most to put information of this kind into
the public domain. It reports average CO2 emissions per container per kilometer for
25 trade lanes on an annual basis, breaking the data down into dry and ‘reefer’ (refri-
gerated) containers.67 CCWG’s latest annual report ‘indicates that average CO2
emissions per container per kilometer for global ocean-based transport routes have
declined by 8.4 percent from 2013 to 2014 and by more than 29 percent since
2009’.68 While the CCWG recognises that ‘changes in carrier representation or glo-
bal trade conditions [for example, the use of “slow steaming” during the global reces-
sion] likely explain a portion of these results’, it considers that ‘the continued
performance improvement is also attributable to carrier fleet efficiency and data
quality’.69
Whilst recognising that it is difficult to provide conclusive evidence that improve-
ments in energy efficiency and reductions in GHG emissions are directly and uncon-
trovertibly attributable to the implementation of private standards, CCWG at least
tries to present systematic evidence of the energy efficiency improvements that par-
ticipating vessels and carriers have achieved. While ad hoc examples of improvements
in energy efficiency and/or reductions in GHG emissions attributable to private
standards often emerge in conversation with those working in the organisations con-
cerned, neither these claims nor the supporting data are available in the public
domain.
63 Email to Joanne Scott from Rickard Lindstro¨m, Maritime Sustainability and Account Management, CSI
(8 October 2015).
64 RightShip has entered into a partnership with the Carbon War Room to make this information <http://
www.shippingefficiency.org/> accessed 17 September 2016.
65 For a general discussion about the difficulties of proving causation in relation to corporate social responsi-
bility see Carrie Bradshaw, ‘The Environmental Business Case and Unenlightened Shareholder Value’
(2013) 33 Legal Studies 33.
66 BSR, Collaborative Progress: Clean Cargo Working Group (CCWG): 2015 Progress Report (BSR August
2015).
67 ibid.
68 BSR (n 66) 5.
69 ibid.
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5.2 Low Levels of Ambition
Private standards are facilitative in that they rely on information, processes and per-
suasion to encourage and to overcome obstacles to behavioural change. In many
cases, it is far from straightforward to assess the level of ambition inherent in these
standards, not least because the organisations responsible for administering the
standards tend in the main not to publish data on how significant a contribution to
achieving GHG emission reductions the standards are thought to have made.
Assessing the underlying level of ambition is a little easier when it comes specific-
ally to ship rating schemes. These are distinct from other categories of private stand-
ards in that their implementation necessitates a judgment about how well a particular
vessel or a carrier has performed by reference to substantive benchmarks. This judg-
ment is captured in shorthand form by locating a vessel or carrier at a certain point
on a GHG emissions rating scale (a performance indicator): for example, A-G under
RightShip’s GHG emissions rating scheme, or Levels 1-4 for DNV Triple-E. Where a
vessel or a carrier is awarded an excellent rating as a result of being placed at the top
of the relevant scale, this is intended to communicate the fact that this vessel or car-
rier is performing extremely well.
There are a number of factors that would appear to reduce the level of ambition
inherent in private standards for reducing GHG emissions from shipping including
the various ship rating schemes. First, there is considerable variation in the import-
ance of private standards attribute to GHG emissions relative to other factors, includ-
ing especially other environmental risks posed by ships. This varies from 100% in the
case of RightShip’s GHG Emissions Rating to 2.9% currently in the ESI (which also
includes sulphur oxides and nitrogen oxides). These and other elements pertaining
to level of ambition are set out in Table 2 below.
Further, certain schemes award a top rating to a carrier merely on the basis that it
has complied with a series of relatively non-demanding procedural requirements. We
see this especially in relation to DNV-Triple E and the Green Award.70 The ESI
awards a maximum GHG emissions score to companies that merely report basic data
on fuel consumption and distance travelled.71 However, because the GHG emissions
component of the scheme makes up only 2.9% of the final possible score, even com-
panies that do not report this basic data can achieve a maximum possible score of
97.1%.72
It is also notable that none of the schemes require any absolute level of attain-
ment in relation to GHG emissions, choosing instead to evaluate performance exclu-
sively by reference to the average vessel’s level of GHG emissions. For example, the
CCWG will award the highest rating to a vessel whose performance is at least 25%
better than the average for the trade lane concerned.73 Likewise, RightShip and the
CSI use data relating to performance relative to the industry average to determine
the rating to be awarded to a particular vessel.74 It is, therefore, the case that if
70 For details see DNV Triple-E <https://www.dnvgl.com/maritime/advisory/triple-e.html> accessed 17
September 2016 and Green Award http://www.greenaward.org/greenaward/> accessed 17 September 2016.
71 For details see ESI (n 44).
72 This becomes apparent from the ‘Formulas’ section of ESI’s website (n44).
73 CCWG, ‘How to Calculate and Manage CO2 Emissions from Ocean Transport’ (February 2015) 3.
74 CSI Guidance Document Version 5.0 (April 2015) 10.
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Table 2 Level of ambition inherent in ship rating schemes
Rating scheme Weight attached to
GHG emissions
Performance required to
achieve top score
Rightship ‘s GHG
emissions
100% A rating requires a vessel to
achieve an EVDI size score indi-
cating at least two standard devi-
ations from average for similar
sized vessel of same ship type.
rating ‘A’ rating awarded to top 2.5%
ships (but NB operational fac-
tors excluded)
A-G On sample journey of 11,023 naut-
ical miles from Vitoria, Brazil to
Qingdao, China, B rated vessel
emits 13% less CO2 than aver-
age. The equivalent ﬁgure for A-
rated vessels is not provided.
Also, availability of ‘þ’ sign to rec-
ognise approved retroﬁts or
upgrades.
CSI 20% Provision of information þ EEOI
less than 10% above the refer-
ence value (EEOIref).
High (green), medium
(yellow) or low (red)
Green rating awarded to  top
60% ships
Need to score at least 35% in rela-
tion to CO2 to be eligible for
top rating of ‘Green’ (35% of
maximum 30 points ¼ 10.5
points. Three points available
for provision of information,
therefore need 9 points in add-
ition to have potential to achieve
‘Green’. Nine points if EEOI is
less than 10% above the refer-
ence value.
CCWG 40% Attain maximum score for veriﬁed
data þ at least 25% better than
CCWG average for trade lane.
Max score of
100 points
Maximum score awarded to  top
30% ships
ESI 2.9%. Anticipate increasing
weight in future.
Maximum score can be achieved
by reporting two elements of
(Continued)
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benchmark emissions within the relevant segment of the shipping industry increase
on average, an increase in a particular vessel’s emissions can still result in a vessel
achieving a top rating within a ship rating scheme.
Striking also is the fact that in a number of the schemes examined in Table 2, a
lower than average level of performance can still result in the attainment of a top rat-
ing. This is notably the case within the CSI where an energy efficiency score (EEOI)
that is less than 10% above the industry benchmark, can still result in the award of a
sufficient number of points to allow the vessel to be rated as ‘Green’.75
Turning specifically to ship rating schemes, there is significant variation in the
share of participating vessels that are awarded a top ranking within these. While
around 60% of participating vessels are eligible for top ranking (green) within the
Clean Shipping Index, around 40% of participating vessels are eligible for a top-score
(100 points) within the CCWG.76 By contrast, across ships of all types, only 2.5% of
vessels are expected to achieve an A-rating under RightShip’s GHG emissions
rating.77
One additional factor may be usefully highlighted that bears upon the level of am-
bition inherent in RightShip’s GHG emissions rating scheme. As RightShip acknow-
ledges, a ship’s actual emissions will depend not only upon its design characteristics,
but also upon operational factors such as speed, cargo load and weather conditions.
Table 2 (continued)
Rating scheme Weight attached to
GHG emissions
Performance required to
achieve top score
EEOI (fuel consumed and dis-
tance travelled).
DNV-Triple E Covers wide range of factors.
No weighting given.
SEEMP with targets implemented,
monitored and followed-up þ
EEOI used to document energy
efﬁciency performance þ EEDI
for new ships.
4-1 (1 highest)
Green Award Covers wide range of factors.
No weighting given.
Participation in ESI is mandatory.
Award of certiﬁcate Promotes use of SEEMP þ IMO/
industry guidelines to imple-
ment energy efﬁciency
measures.
75 ibid. This can achieve 12 points out of 30 available points when 3 points are also awarded for the provi-
sion of information. To be awarded a ‘Green’ rating the vessel has to score 50% overall and at least 35%
in each of the five available fields.
76 Authors’ own estimate.
77 RightShip, Calculating and Comparing CO2 Emissions from the Global Maritime Fleet (RightShip 2013) 8.
That said, a number of large charterers have used the RightShip GHG emissions rating scheme to elimin-
ate only the least efficient vessels from their supply-chain. Cargill, in particular, no longer charters F and
G rated ships.
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These additional factors are not currently taken into account by RightShip in apply-
ing its GHG emissions rating to ships.78
Finally, in terms of level of ambition, it is important to observe that while the pri-
vate standards under discussion aim to improve the energy efficiency of shipping,
they do not seek to guard against rising GHG emissions that are generated as a result
of increasing transport demand. We will highlight below the importance of the ship-
ping sector’s cumulative emissions.
5.3 Data Reliability
Where private standards involve the collection, use or publication of data, then the
reliability of the data must be considered. This is perhaps of greatest sensitivity where
the purpose of the private standard is to increase the availability of information to en-
courage differentiation between more or less efficient ships. Data can be unreliable
due to the poor quality of the data measurement or due to the intentional submis-
sion of misleading data. Table 3 outlines for three of the initiatives that are particu-
larly data-centric, some of the details that can influence data reliability. This issue can
be addressed through the inclusion of a verification step, and Table 3 also details the
required verification step for each of these three initiatives.
The table shows that in several instances the information submitter has a vested
interest in the values of the data (eg the shipowner has a vested interest in reporting
a good performance), and this increases the importance of the verification step.
Furthermore, there appears to be limited specification of data measurement stand-
ards—perhaps a symptom of the shortage of available standards in this area of in-
service fuel consumption and efficiency measurement. Without further analysis, this
Table 3 Key data reliability parameters for three of the data-centric private
standard initiatives
Source or submitter
of data
Measurement standard
(eg specification of
sensor accuracies)
Verification
Rightship
GHG rating
Either IHS
Maritime database,
ship owner or
classiﬁcation
societies
Industry standard
procedures
Some veriﬁcation
for ship owner
submitted data
CSI Ship owner None Sampled veriﬁcation
CCWG Ship owner None listed in
public domain
Some veriﬁcation
applied, but no detail
given in the public domain
78 RightShip suggests that ‘[b]y focusing on design and then supplementing results with operational metrics,
a more meaningful outcome is achievable - enabling a like-for-like comparison.’ ibid 17. RightShip does
recognise retrofits and upgrades through the award of a ‘þ’ rating.
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implies that there is scope for improvement both with regards to verification and the
specification of data measurement.
Further insights on data reliability can be obtained through investigation of
RightShip’s GHG emissions rating. This uses an Existing Vessel Design Index
(EVDI) to estimate a ship’s CO2 emissions per tonne nautical mile travelled and to
compare emissions from existing vessels of a similar size and type. This measurement
draws upon a number of different data sources, including RightShip’s own vetting
database, the IHS Maritime and Trade database, classification societies, engine manu-
facturers and shipyards. In many instances (especially in relation to ships built before
the entry of the IMO’s EEDI regulations in 2013), the dominant source of informa-
tion in the calculation of a ship’s EVDI is the IHS Maritime and Trade database.
This IHS database collects data from a variety of sources, but IHS Maritime and
Trade does not offer any guarantee or explanation of the quality procedures followed
in collecting this data. RightShip acknowledges the differential reliability of different
sources of information, and has therefore established a hierarchy of data sources as
follows:
1. EEDI from Class—(most preferred)
2. Ship sourced data—eg sea trial and shop tests
3. Industry/third-party data sources—eg engine manufacturers’ speciﬁcations
or ship yard data
4. Assumed data/databases—(eg IHS Maritime and Trade data) (least
preferred)
A systematic analysis of the population of some of the key fields within the data-
base undertaken as part of the IMO’s Third Greenhouse Gas Study79 found that
some fields of the database (main engine consumption) are only 20–30% populated,
and the ‘speed’ field used in the EVDI is populated 87–93%. Analysis of the accuracy
of the RightShip EVDI calculations has been performed in a study that was commis-
sioned by RightShip and carried out in 2015 by DNV GL80. For a number of ships
that had EEDI ratings (which are rigorously calculated and verified according to pro-
cedures defined by the IMO), the EVDI was also calculated. The median difference
between EVDI and EEDI was found to be 5% which is equivalent to approximately
one rate difference in the A-G system (meaning, eg that a ship would receive a
RightShip rating of E rather than F).81
Given that there is this choice to volunteer to submit verified EVDI or EEDI data
if they have an EEDI certificate, this immediately identifies a bias (the value of EVDI
is known to be a function of the different calculation methods used, and the data is
biased preferentially to those ships with data sourced from class, ship owners or
79 Smith and others (n 6). Tristan Smith was lead author on this IMO report.
80 RightShip, ‘GHG Emissions Ratings, DNV GL Review: Executive Summary’ (RightShip 2015) <http://
site.rightship.com/resources/downloads/dnv-gl-methodology-review-executive-summary/> accessed 17
September 2016.
81 ibid. In discussion with Tristan Smith, a representative of RightShip suggested that the fact that the EVDI
is conservative relative to EEDI acts as an incentive for shipowners to submit verified data as it is likely
that this will improve their rating
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yards). However, the more pertinent question in a relative rating scheme is not what
the median difference is, but the extent of the standard deviation or variability of the
difference. This would indicate how consistently the EVDI derived ratings was in its
ranking.
An independent study using a similar method to DNV GL, comparing ships
which had published EEDI with their Estimated Index Value (EIV) was undertaken
by CE Delft.82 Whilst EIV’s are not identical to unverified EVDI scores, the data
source and method used are very close and so inference can be drawn from this
study on the accuracy of RightShip’s unverified EVDI. The study calculated the coef-
ficient of determination (R2) in the relationship between the EEDI and EIV scores,
and found overall a value of 0.92, but that for some ship types (bulk carriers), the co-
efficient was as low as 0.66.83 This finding indicates that many values of unverified
EVDI are misrepresentative of a ship’s actual design efficiency, and are creating
errors in the rank-ordering that informs the A–G scale.
Recognition should be given to RightShip acknowledgment of the need for data
validation, and their appeal to interested parties—ship owners/managers—to update
their RightShip-calculated EVDI values. However, since there is no stated validation
procedure,84 or stipulation that the validation be carried out or audited by an inde-
pendent third party, this updating risks adding further erroneous data to the data-
base. In combination with a database that already mixes two sources of data which
have an acknowledged difference (EEDI and EVDI), this updated data has the po-
tential to further reduce the reliability of the RightShip’s GHG Emissions Rating.
Other private standards, such as the CSI, use ship-owner reported data. The CO2
component of the CSI requests an owner or operator’s Energy Efficiency Operational
Indicators (EEOI) which is calculated using annual fuel consumption and transport
work. Independent studies85 have attempted to perform this calculation for a number
of ship owners and found variability from company to company in the method and
quality of the data. For all shipping companies inspected in the study, there were some
ships and voyages for which the data was too poor to enable the calculation. To the
credit of the CSI, there is a defined verification procedure that is performed by an in-
dependent third party (classification societies).86 At present carriers are required to ver-
ify at least two vessels which may constitute a very small percentage of their fleet.
Nonetheless, CSI’s ultimate goal is to ensure that all vessels included in its index are
subject to verification. Maersk, which is considered to be an industry leader in this
field, already permits random verification of its entire fleet. The CCWG also has a veri-
fication procedure (protocol).87 However, no detail is given in the public domain of
this protocol and the requirements of carriers to apply the protocol to their fleets.
82 Jasper Faber and others, Estimated Index Values of New Ships: Analysis of EIVs of Ships that Have Entered
The Fleet Since 2009 (CE Delft 2015) 14
83 ibid.
84 See, eg the International Organization for Standardization’s defined sea trial standards (ISO
15016:2015).
85 Sophia Parker and others, Understanding the Energy Efficiency Operational Indicator: An Empirical Analysis
of Ships from the Royal Belgian Shipowners (UCL Energy Institute 2015).
86 CSI, Verification Guidelines’ for Vessels and Shipping Companies Version 4 (April 2015).
87 ibid.
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In summary, there are a number of identifiable shortcomings on data quality
across existing private standards. These could be addressed by developing or incor-
porating internationally recognised protocols for data measurement and analysis into
the standard and/or by placing greater emphasis upon verification, eg through ran-
dom, independent auditing and cross-referencing.
6 . EXPLAINING THE LIMITS OF PRIVATE STANDARDS GOVERNING
GHG EMISSIONS FROM SHIPPING
We have identified a number of deficiencies inherent in private standards governing
GHG emissions from shipping. We turn now to examine the context in which these
standards have emerged with a view to understanding better why they are
characterised by these deficiencies albeit to different degrees. To do so, we make use
of an analytical framework developed by Mattli and Woods to assist in evaluating
when regulation (public or private) may be expected to serve the public interest as
opposed to the concentrated interests of narrow elites.88 This analytical framework
emphasises the importance of ‘institutional supply’ and ‘societal demand’ in shaping
regulatory outcomes.89 The more extensive the institutional supply and the more ro-
bust the societal demand, the more likely it is that public interest-oriented regulation
will emerge.
The concept of institutional supply concerns the institutional context in which
regulatory processes occur. This is deemed to be ‘extensive’ and to promote the pub-
lic interest when it provides for ‘open forums, proper due process, multiple access
points, and oversight mechanisms’.90 By contrast, it is deemed to be ‘limited’ and to
favour elite interests when regulatory processes are ‘club-like, that is, exclusive, closed
and secretive’.91
The concept of societal demand, by contrast, concerns the breadth and intensity
of the demand within society for regulatory change. This is said to depend upon the
availability of information about the social costs of inadequate regulation (‘demon-
stration effects’), the mobilisation of broad coalitions of actors with an interest in
achieving regulatory change, and the emergence of ideas that can serve to motivate
and sustain these broad coalitions.92
Institutional supply appears to be quite limited in relation to private standards
governing GHG emissions from shipping. Industry actors play a dominant role in
the promulgation and implementation of these standards, including cargo owners,
ship owners and freight forwarders. Most of the bodies in question were established
by, and are governed by, actors from within the shipping industry and provide no
formal opportunities for non-industry actors, including NGOs, to participate in their
decision-making processes. While there tends to be a relatively high level of transpar-
ency as regards the methodologies underpinning private standards, there is limited
88 Mattli and Woods (n 1).
89 ibid 17–21.
90 ibid 17.
91 ibid.
92 ibid 21–39.
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ongoing transparency. For example, the agendas and minutes of meetings are not
published.
Even where these private standard setting bodies are formally independent of in-
dustry, as is the case for example with the CCWG, industry actors continue to play a
dominant role.93 The CCWG was set up by the Business Sustainability Roundtable
which is a business-oriented NGO. Membership is made up of cargo owners, ship-
ping companies and freight-forwarders and it is strongly, and explicitly, member
driven in its operation.
Equally, the oversight mechanisms put in place to enhance the accountability of
the relevant private standard setting bodies tend to be ad hoc. Whilst a number of
these methodologies have been improved as a result of independent, third-party re-
views,94 there is an absence of established procedures for routinised, ongoing, scru-
tiny of the standards and their implementation.95
When we turn to consider the demand for private standards governing GHG
emissions from shipping, we can gain further insight into the reasons for their short-
comings, including by comparison with the more encouraging example of private
standards governing ship safety/survival and oil pollution highlighted above. Of par-
ticular salience is the fact that demand for GHG standards appears to be narrow ra-
ther than broad. Drawing upon Mattli and Woods’ typology of different
‘entrepreneurs of regulatory change’,96 it is ‘corporate consumers’, namely those who
are paying for shipping services and who have an economic interest in reducing fuel
use, who constitute the principal drivers of demand. There is evidence that this de-
mand does not resonate strongly with shipping companies (including ship managers,
owners and operators). Although energy efficiency is said by most shipping compa-
nies to the topic of key importance,97 the average quantitative energy saving target of
shipping companies lack ambition and the ‘organizational anchoring’ of energy man-
agement in shipping remains weak.98 Survey evidence demonstrates a relatively low
93 The ESI (n 44) was established by the World Ports Climate Initiative (WPCI) which brings together
55 key ports in a bid to reduce maritime GHG emissions. See WPCI, ‘About us’ <http://wpci.iaphworld
ports.org/about-us/index.html> accessed 1 October 2016. However, as noted, GHG emissions play a
very small role within the rating scheme established by the ESI.
94 For example, DAMCO’s CarbonDashboard was verified by academics at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (Edgar E Blanco and Anthony J Craig, ‘Detailed Logistics Information in Carbon Footprints’
(MIT Center for Transportation and Logistics 2009) and RightShip’s GHG emissions rating was re-
viewed by DNV-GL(DNV GL, ‘GHG Emissions Rating’ (November 2015).
95 Green Award is an outlier in this respect in that it has a formal, elaborate, governance structure in place,
including by-laws to govern its operation. See the materials included under the heading ‘organisation’
<http://www.greenaward.org/greenaward/> accessed on 17 September 2016. Nonetheless, industry
actors remain dominant within this and third parties are precluded from lodging a complaint before its
Board of Appeal.
96 Mattli and Woods (n 1) 28–36. These include NGOs, public officials and private sector entrepreneurs
(corporations). In relation to the last category, they distinguish between corporate newcomers, corpor-
ations at risk, corporate consumers and corporate levellers of the playing field.
97 DNV-GL (n 8) 13. 76% of the shipping companies surveyed considered the realisation of energy/bunker
savings to be the topic of key importance.
98 ibid. The average annual fuel reduction targets of the shipping companies surveyed in 2015 was 2.8%, the
same as in 2014. 28% of the companies surveyed have no fuel reduction target. Less than one-third of the
companies surveyed had a dedicated energy manager or team.
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uptake of energy efficiency measures especially for the measures that can help to re-
duce emissions significantly.99
Demand for private standards seems to be more intense within the container sec-
tor where the take-up of private standards is much greater even though the standards
themselves are still flawed. There are many reasons for this augmented take-up
including higher fuel costs due to higher average speeds (even in an era of slow
steaming), and the fact that these companies are more public-facing in that they
transport goods for consumers in rich countries. Also, the container sector is much
more consolidated, with around twelve companies dominating global supply.100
Partly because of this, containerships tend to be on longer contracts and are often
owned and operated by the same company.101 Consequently, there are fewer market
barriers and an easier alignment of incentives on the benefits of data sharing. More
anecdotally, there also seems to be a ‘Maersk effect’, whereby the environmental
leadership shown by this company has encouraged their competitors to keep up by
signing up to the ship rating schemes.
Overall, the demand for private standards governing GHG emissions from ship-
ping is much narrower and less intense than that leading to the emergence of private
standards governing ship safety/survival and oil pollution. The latter were driven by
dramatic evidence of the consequences of weak regulation including accidents and
serious maritime pollution incidents and by the coming together of a broad coalition
of environmental NGOs and ‘corporations at risk, including marine insurers, class
societies, ship owners; and their various collective associations’.102
While, in general it is difficult to ascribe particular shortcomings to particular as-
pects of underlying demand, there is one feature of the private standards governing
GHG emissions from shipping that may suggest a direct correlation of this kind. The
primary objective of the corporate consumers who drive demand for these private
standards is to save money as a result of energy efficiency improvements in shipping.
While they are, therefore, keen to promote standards that reduce the GHG emissions
intensity of shipping, they are not, absent external intervention, keen to promote the
adoption of standards that limit the sector’s total, cumulative emissions because this
could serve to constrain the sector’s overall growth. It is, therefore, unsurprising that
none of the private standards highlighted above seek to constrain the sector’s cumu-
lative emissions.
Yet, as was noted previously, the introduction of a quantitative cap on the entire
shipping sector’s cumulative emissions could be of key importance due its capacity
to alter the relationship between different companies within this sector. An overall
99 Nishatabbas Rehmatulla, Barriers to the Update of Energy Efficient Operational Measures: Survey Report
(Energy Institute UCL 2012).
100 See ‘Alphaliner - Top 100 Operated Fleets as per 3 October 2016’ <http://www.alphaliner.com/
top100/> accessed 3 October 2016. The top 12 operators represent over 70% of the global container
line capacity.
101 UNCTAD, Table 1.7. ‘Developments in International Seaborne Trade. UNCTAD Review of Maritime
Transport’ (2015), Table 1.7 showing that the global container trade is still dominated (in 2014), by
Asia–Europe and Asia–US trade.
102 Samuel Barrows, ‘Racing to the Top. . .at Last’ in Mattli and Woods (n 1). Also Elisabeth de Sombre,
Flagging Standards: Globailization and Environmental, Safety, and Labor Regulations at Sea (MIT Press
2006) ch 8.
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emissions cap of this kind could serve to create interdependence between different
companies by making it clear that they are engaged in a zero-sum game. Every tonne
of CO2 emitted by one vessel/company would imply that one tonne less is available
to other vessels/companies that make up the sector as a whole.
A cumulative emissions frame recognises the need for the shipping sector as a
whole to operate within the confines of an overall carbon budget if it is to play its
part in limiting dangerous climate change.103 Where the whole sector’s absolute level
of carbon emissions is constrained by external action, each shipping company re-
sponsible for generating GHG emissions will have a direct interest in encouraging
the emergence of a regulatory framework that prevents or discourages other compa-
nies from using more than their fair share of what is now conceived of as a finite
sector-wide carbon budget.
The existence of economic interdependence between companies has been one of
the key factors influencing the adoption of private standards in shipping. For ex-
ample, outside of the area of climate change, ship owners have taken steps to pool
third-party liabilities through the establishment of individual P&I Clubs as well as an
overarching International Group of P&I Clubs.104 These bodies adopted private
standards to govern the behaviour of (prospective) members to guard against the
‘moral hazard’ that is associated with the pooling of risk.105
The legal scholar Neil Gunningham has recognised the important role that inter-
dependence between companies—particularly reputational interdependence—can
play in driving the adoption of sector-wide private standards, arguing that companies
sometimes require a ‘collective licence to operate’.106 In this and other respects,
Gunningham pays particular attention to the intersection between law and private
standards, emphasising that law can play an important role in generating and sustain-
ing interdependencies between companies. To take the example of oil pollution from
ships, the adoption of mandatory third-party liability insurance for oil tankers served
as an important catalyst for the establishment of P&I Clubs as referred to above.107
It is to this intersection between law and private standards, including law’s role in the
emergence of a collective licence to operate, that this article will now turn.
7. THE INTERACTION BETWEEEN LAW AND PRIVATE STANDARDS
This article took the inadequacy of legal responses to the regulation of GHG emis-
sions from shipping as its starting point. It was in light of this that it set out to
explore the possible contribution of private standards. It may, therefore, seem
counter-intuitive to now address the question of what role law and law-making
103 For an effort to derive CO2 budgets for the shipping sector that are consistent with limiting global
warming to 2 C and 1.5 C, respectively see Smith and others (n 6).
104 Paul Bennett, ‘Mutual Risk: P&I Insurance Clubs and Maritime Safety and Environmental Performance’
(2001) 25 Marine Policy 13.
105 Furger (n 29) 460–62, 465–66. Moral hazard arises because companies might be lax in the safety stand-
ards that they follow, secure in the knowledge that the economic costs of ship losses or pollution inci-
dents for which they are responsible will be widely shared across all of the members of a P&I Club.
106 Neil Gunningham, ‘Corporate Environmental Responsibility: Law and the Limits of Voluntarism’ in
Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu and Tom Campbell (eds), The New Corporate Accountability:
Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (CUP 2009).
107 Benjamin Richardson, Environmental Regulation through Financial Organisations (Kluwer 2002) 374.
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processes can play in mitigating the deficiencies inherent in private standards.
Nonetheless, there are already reasons to think that law can shape private standards
in a positive way.108 For the purpose of this discussion, we use the term law to refer
to measures adopted by states as well as regional and international organisations that
embody procedural and/or substantive standards of conduct for specified actors.
These measures may impose standards of conduct that are binding on the actors
concerned or they may create incentives to encourage compliance.
First at a general level, even law-making processes that ‘fail’ in the sense that they
do not result in the adoption of new laws have the potential to play a role in increas-
ing demand for private standards. These processes may signal the likely adoption of
future regulation within the same forum or within a different forum. The processes
leading to the conclusion of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change are exemplary
in this respect. While the decision of the Conference of the Parties to exclude inter-
national shipping from the text of this agreement was viewed positively by some
within the shipping industry, it was condemned by a number of major ship own-
ers.109 It is reported to have led the Danish and Swedish Shipowners’ Associations to
announce plans to implement their own GHG emission reduction goals, and to en-
courage others within the sector to do the same.110 These reactions were motivated
by a desire to counter the threat of regional—especially EU—regulation.111
Even where it is not possible to find clear evidence of cause and effect between
law-making processes that are less than entirely successful in their own terms and the
emergence or strengthening of private standards, it is likely that these processes can
serve to increase awareness of the inadequacy of the existing regulatory framework
and facilitate the building of alliances between those who favour stronger regulation.
Within the IMO at present, it is the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) which is
taking the lead in calling for a GHG emission reduction target for international ship-
ping and in building an alliance of states to press for the adoption of a work-plan to
define the what the shipping sector’s ‘fair share’ of the global climate change mitiga-
tion burden should be.112 RMI’s proposal received the ‘in principle’ support of the
International Chamber of Shipping which has called upon the IMO to develop an
‘Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC)’ on CO2 reduction for the
international shipping sector.113
108 This is consistent with Abbott and Snidal’s discussion of the background role of law in their overview of
the regulatory standard-setting and of the different competencies that contribute to the emergence of
public-interest oriented regulatory standards (n 25) 83–87.
109 The Naval Architect, ‘Air Power: More than Just a Wind Up’ (RINA, May 2016) <http://www.rina.
org.uk/NA_May_two.html> accessed 3 October 2016.
110 ibid.
111 M Schuler, ‘Maersk’s disappointed at shipping’s exclusion from Paris climate deal’ <http://gcaptain.
com/maersk-disappointed-by-shippings-omission-from-paris-climate-deal (gCaptain 16 December
2016)> accessed 3 October 2016.
112 IMO, ‘Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships: Setting a reduction target and agreeing associated meas-
ures for international shipping’ submitted by the Marshall Islands (MEPC 68/5/1) and IMO,
‘International shipping’s share in international efforts to limit the rise of global average temperature’ sub-
mitted by Belgium, France, Germany, the Marshall Islands, Morocco and Solomon Islands (MEPC79/7/
2).
113 IMO, ‘Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships: Proposal to develop an Intended IMO Determined
Contribution on CO2 reduction for international shipping’ Submitted by the ICS (MEPC 69/7/1). The
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Current discussions within the IMO about how to define the international ship-
ping sector’s ‘fair share’ of global GHG emissions have the potential to help change
the nature of the debate by shifting the focus of discussion from energy efficiency to
cumulative GHG emissions. The goal of those who favour this ‘fair share’ approach
is to determine what the shipping sector’s fair share of a global carbon budget should
be. As noted previously, this kind of cumulative emissions frame has the potential to
enhance demand for sector-wide standards because it generates the kind of interde-
pendencies necessary to create a ‘collective licence to operate’.114
Law-making processes that do lead to the adoption of new laws may also play a
role in galvanising and shaping private standards. We can see this in relation to the
IMO’s EEDI regulations which, as noted previously, only apply to new ships. When
Denmark submitted its proposal for the EEDI in 2007, it stated that ‘it is not incon-
ceivable that design indices or equivalent may be applied retroactively to existing
ships’.115 Subsequently, RightShip, acting ‘in response to customer demand’ de-
veloped a similar tool (the Existing Vessel Design Index) to measure the CO2 emis-
sions of existing ships.116
It is also relevant to consider whether the EU’s recently adopted Regulation on
the Monitoring Reporting and Verification of shipping emissions (EU-MRV) has the
potential to influence private standards.117 This regulation requires companies oper-
ating large ships to report annually to the EU on the volume of CO2 that is emitted
on voyages to and from ports within the jurisdiction of EU Member States and whilst
within those ports.118 They are also required to report on a range of additional fac-
tors (parameters) including distance travelled, time at sea and cargo carried to facili-
tate determination of a ship’s average energy efficiency.119 The data submitted by
shipping companies will be subject to independent verification and information per-
taining to a particular ship will be published on an annual basis.120
This Regulation represents a significant step forward in increasing the transpar-
ency of GHG emissions data in respect of voyages to or from EU ports. It therefore
goes some way towards removing the incentive of ship owners to maintain the confi-
dentiality of data, whether for reasons of commercial confidentiality or for fears that
the ready availability of data may facilitate the adoption of future regulation.
Importantly, the EU generated data will be available not only to ship owners but to
regulators and campaigning NGOs.
Although the first annual monitoring period under EU-MRV is not until 2018,121
its future is already uncertain in view of recent and ongoing developments in the
ICS represents 80% of the world’s merchant fleet. INDCs were renamed NDCs by the Paris Climate
Change Agreement.
114 Gunningham (n 106).
115 As reported in RightShip (n 78) 3.
116 ibid.
117 EU-MRV (n 4).
118 Large means above 5,000 gross tonnes. Emissions from last/first port of call before or after calling at an
EU port will be included, with ‘port of call’ being defined as a port where a ship stops to load or unload
cargo or to embark or disembark passengers (ibid, art 3(c)).
119 ibid, art 9(1).
120 ibid, arts 13–17, 21.
121 ibid, art 8.
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IMO. The EU has made it clear that it views EU-MRV as providing a catalyst to-
wards the establishment of a global data collection system for GHG emissions in
shipping.122 While the EU has used the adoption of EU-MRV to impose pressure on
the IMO, it has not so far sought to use it to induce an improvement in the design
and operation of private standards. By contrast with other areas of EU law, the EU
has not sought to use the adoption of EU legislation to carve out a role for itself as a
‘meta-regulator’ vis-a-vis private standard-setting bodies. We will conclude this sec-
tion by considering whether there may be potential for the EU to assume a role of
this kind.
The concept of meta-regulation is used to refer ‘to ways that outside regulators
deliberately—rather than unintentionally—seek to induce targets to develop their
own internal, self-regulatory responses to public problems’.123 In the context of this
article, we view the EU as the outside regulator and private standard-setting bodies
as their target. The EU performs a meta-regulatory function in a range of other areas.
Perhaps the clearest example arises in EU regulation of biofuels.124 Here, EU legisla-
tion permits suppliers of biofuels to demonstrate compliance with the EU’s sustain-
ability criteria by obtaining certification from a voluntary or international scheme
which sets standards for the production of biomass and which has been recognised
by the EU.125
For a voluntary scheme to obtain EU recognition, it must comply with the re-
quirements laid down in EU legislation. The scheme must meet ‘adequate standards
of reliability, transparency and independent auditing’,126 and schemes that measure
GHG emissions savings are also required to comply with a range of additional meth-
odological requirements.127 Voluntary schemes that have obtained EU recognition
are required to submit a detailed annual report to the European Commission to
122 Commission, ‘Integrating Maritime Transport Emissions in the EU’s Greenhouse Gas Reduction
Policies’ COM (2013) 479, 5.
123 Cary Coglianese and Evan Mendelson, ‘Meta-Regulation and Self-Regulation’ in Robert Baldwin, Martin
Cave and Martin Lodge (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (OUP 2010). Lister and others (n
21) 20 use the concept of ‘orchestration’ to address some of the same issues. Our EU-MRV example
would take the form of ‘directive orchestration’ in these terms. Among their varied suggestions, they
argue that the IMO could consider aligning its fuel data collection system with the methodologies
underpinning private standards and provide incentives to encourage independent auditing of data (193).
124 Yoshiko Naiki, ‘Bioenergy and Trade: Explaining and Assessing the Regime Complex for Sustainable
Biofuels’ (2016) 27 European Journal of International Law 129 and Jolene Lin, ‘The Environmental
Regulation of Biofuels: Limits of the Meta-Standard Approach’ (2011) 5 Carbon and Climate Law
Review 34. European Parliament and Council Dir 2009/28/EC of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of
the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ [2009] L140/16, arts 17–23. This was recently amended
by European Parliament and Council Dir 2015/1513/EU of 9 September 2015 amending Dir 98/70/
EC relating to the quality of petrol and diesel fuels and amending Dir 2009/28/EC on the promotion of
the use of energy from renewable sources OJ [2015] L239/1 in order to strengthen the meta-regulatory
aspects of this instrument. For an additional example, see Reg 995/2010 Reg 995/2010/EU of 20
October 2010 laying down the obligations of operators who place timber on the market OJ [2010]
L295/23, especially art 8(6). For a discussion of the relationship between certification schemes and the
EU’s due diligence system see Christine Overdevest and Jonathan Zeitlin, ‘Assembling an
Experimentalist Regime: Transnational Governance Interactions in the Forest Sector’ (2014) 8
Regulation & Governance 22.
125 Dir 2009/28/EC, ibid art 18(4).
126 ibid art 18(5).
127 ibid.
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assist the Commission to identify best practices and to report on this to the
European Parliament.128
What is striking about this example is how well adapted the EU’s meta-regulatory
requirements for biofuels could be in addressing the transparency and data reliability
deficits that are often present in private standards. In light of this, the Commission
may wish to consider whether there is scope for the EU to perform a meta-
regulatory function under EU-MRV. We make a brief argument in favour of this
proposition, whilst acknowledging the existence of a number of obstacles that might
be thought to stand in its way.
As things stands, EU-MRV is dominated by a compliance-oriented approach. It
lays down detailed, prescriptive methods and rules for monitoring CO2 emissions
and other parameters.129 It establishes a standardised MRV framework which is ex-
pected to be further refined though the adoption of delegated acts by the European
Commission. In keeping with this, EU-MRV accords a largely passive role to the
legal entities that bear responsibility for verifying compliance with the EU’s detailed
methods and rules.130 Verifiers are not expected to contribute to the future develop-
ment of the EU’s MRV framework and the EU places relatively few demands upon
them. Verifiers are required to be independent and to act in the public interest in car-
rying out their activities under the Regulation.131
Under a meta-regulatory approach, it would be open to private standard-setting
bodies to apply for EU recognition of their privately developed MRV systems in ex-
change for their demonstrating compliance with a range of EU requirements.
Members of ship rating schemes that have been recognised by the EU would be able
to demonstrate compliance with EU-MRV by relying upon data that has been gener-
ated as a result of their participation in this recognised scheme. For existing mem-
bers, this would represent a cost saving in that they would not be required to comply
with two different sets of data gathering requirements. A meta-regulatory approach
of this kind would aim to foster an active rather than a passive role for private bodies
and to encourage innovation and competition in designing cost-effective systems of
MRV. Private bodies would, on the one hand, be accorded greater autonomy in de-
veloping their own MRV systems but, on the other, they would be required to gain
EU recognition of this system before their clients could rely upon it to demonstrate
compliance with EU-MRV. The key elements of both a compliance-oriented and
meta-regulatory approach are identified in the Table 4.
A meta-regulatory approach would offer the key advantage that the EU would be
empowered to shape the design and operation of private standards. It would also
leave space for experimentation in the design of cost-effective MRV systems, thereby
creating opportunities for the EU to gain insight into best practice and to consider
128 ibid art 18(6).
129 ibid, in particular annexes I and II. At a general level, however, the Regulation does allow ship owners to
choose from four possible monitoring methods (the use of Bunker Fuel Delivery Notes, bunker fuel
tank monitoring on-board, flow meters for applicable combustion processes or direct emission measure-
ments). However, it provides detailed specifications in relation to each of these.
130 ibid, arts 13-15 concerning the role of verifiers. Verifiers are required to be accredited by national
authorities.
131 ibid, art 14(1).
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revising its own MRV framework in the light of this.132 Such insights could be espe-
cially valuable at the current time because there would be an opportunity to take
them into account in the design of laws adopted in the future by either the EU or
the IMO.
What then are the main obstacles that might stand in the way of this proposal?
First, the EU may be conceived as a ‘contingent unilateralist’, deploying unilateral ac-
tion to overcome negotiation blockages in international organisations.133 It is con-
sistent with this identity that the EU has stated that if agreement on a global data
collection system is reached within the IMO, the EU shall review EU-MRV and,
where appropriate, propose amendments to it to ensure that it is aligned with the
global system.134 If this alignment (global harmonisation) were to occur, the EU
would no longer enjoy the regulatory flexibility necessary to pursue a meta-
regulatory approach. Moreover, while the EU has the institutional resources to
implement a meta-regulatory approach, including established procedures for the
adoption of delegated legislation,135 the IMO is not similarly endowed with nimble
legislative procedures of this kind.136 It is, therefore, much more difficult to contem-
plate the emergence of a meta-regulatory approach—which requires the regular
adoption and updating of recognition decisions—within the IMO.
Table 4 Compliance-oriented approach versus meta-regulatory approach
Compliance-oriented Meta-regulatory
Nature of norms Detailed, prescriptive,
methods and rules
Broad objectives and principles
Role of private
bodies
Perform passive function,
verifying compliance with
existing methods and rules
Perform active function, designing
bespoke MRV schemes
Meta-regulatory
role of EU
Impose limited demands
on private bodies (veriﬁers)
seeking EU recognition
relating to independence and
public interest orientation
Impose far-reaching demands on
private standard-setting bodies
seeking EU recognition of their
bespoke MRV schemes
132 In this, it resembles the model of experimentalist governance proposed by Charles Sabel and Jonathan
Zeitlin, ‘Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance’ (2008) 14
ELJ 271. This new architecture promotes experimentation in the pursuit of broadly framed objectives
and puts in place procedures to identify best practice and to revise the regulatory framework in light of
these.
133 See Joanne Scott and Lavanya. Rajamani, ‘EU Climate Change Unilateralism’ (2011) 23 European
Journal of International Law 469.
134 EU-MRV (n 4) art 22(3).
135 The EU has established procedures for the adoption of delegated legislation including elaborate ‘comi-
tology’ procedures. European Parliament and Council Reg 182/2011/EU of 16 February 2011 laying
down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the
Commission’s exercise of implementing powers OJ [2011] L55/291.
136 The IMO generally acts on the basis of consensus although amendments can be adopted by a ‘tacit ac-
ceptance’ procedure that creates a presumption in favour of adoption barring objections from a specified
number of states.
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Nonetheless, while discussions are continuing within the IMO on the establish-
ment of a global data collection system to record the fuel used by ships,137 the final
contours of this system remain uncertain. And so too does the eventual willingness
of the EU to align its robust regional system with what may turn out to be a consid-
erably weaker global alternative.138 It is anticipated that the IMO will provide for the
adoption of a mandatory but confidential data protection system which will only re-
cord fuel consumption in combination with proxies for transport work (the IMO is
expected to collect only maximum capacity, not actual cargo mass data).139 A confi-
dential system of this kind which does not include actual cargo mass data may well
be considered by the European Commission to fall short of what is required to jus-
tify the introduction of legislative proposals to amend the EU’s existing MRV frame-
work. The European Commission enjoys broad discretion in deciding when it is
‘appropriate’ to put forward legislative proposals and the adoption of legislation
would require the approval of the European Parliament and the Council.140 Given
that the review process within the EU may take many years to complete, the strong
likelihood is that EU-MRV and the IMO’s data collection system will run in parallel,
at least for a reasonably lengthy period of time.
Secondly, while the EU considers that the introduction of EU-MRV is worthwhile
in its own right, it also conceives it as a first step in a staged approach to regulation,
and ultimately as paving the way for the adoption by the EU or the IMO of a
market-based measure (MBM)—such as an emissions trading scheme—for ship-
ping.141 It is likely that any future MBM would require a robust and harmonised
MRV framework to ensure the integrity of the emissions market and the equal treat-
ment of those buying and selling emission allowances within it. As with global align-
ment, harmonisation would curtail the EU’s regulatory flexibility and threaten to
impede realisation of a more experimentalist, meta-regulatory, approach.
However, it may be also possible to use the EU’s preference for a staged approach
to support the argument in favour of EU meta-regulation. The viability of this ap-
proach would depend upon private standard-setting bodies having an incentive to
apply for EU recognition of their privately developed MRV systems, bearing in mind
that recognition would be conditional upon their demonstrating compliance with a
range of potentially demanding EU requirements. It may be that this incentive would
reside in the opportunity that these bodies would enjoy to develop and, where ap-
propriate, commercialise MRV systems that are more cost-effective than the system
that is currently embodied within EU-MRV. This could serve as a strong incentive
137 IMO (n 3) section 6 (MEPC 69/21). The IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee formally
adopted its data collection system at its 70th Session which met on 24-26th October 2016 whilst this
article was in production.
138 Unni Einemo, ‘EU Evasive on Aligning EU MRV with Future IMO System’ Sustainable Shipping (21
October 2015).
139 Draft Amendments to MARPOL Annex VI (Data collection system for fuel consumption from ships)
(MEPC 69/21/Add.1, Appendix 7).
140 The legislation would have to be adopted under the EU’s ordinary legislative procedure, the details of
which are laid down in art 294 TFEU.
141 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the monitoring,
reporting and verification of carbon dioxide emissions from maritime transport and amending
Regulation (EU) No 525/2013’ COM(2013) 480 final, 2–3.
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given that there some within industry consider that the obligations imposed by EU-
MRV are unnecessarily onerous.142 However, an additional incentive may also arise
from the fact that private standard-setting bodies may wish to shape the EU-MRV
framework because this may in time come to underpin, or at least influence, the
mode of operation of future regulation including a possible future MBM.
8. CONCLUSION
Progress in regulating GHG emissions from shipping has been slow and has been
thwarted in significant part because of disagreements between countries about the
status and implications of the CBDR principle. It is against this backdrop that private
standards governing GHG emissions from international shipping have emerged.
Whilst private standards have attracted considerable attention across law, sociology
and political science, and whilst environmental standards feature high on the list of
those most studied, those that seek to mitigate GHG emissions from shipping have
been largely neglected to date.143 This is a pity because these standards are import-
ant both in view of their potential to mitigate the climate change impact of shipping
and because they can help us to understand why some private standards may be
more effective than others.144
In this article, we have explored the promise and the limits of private standards
that are intended to mitigate GHG emissions from shipping. We have identified a
number of key deficiencies and tried to understand the reasons for these.
In light of this, we turned to consider interactions between law and private stand-
ards. Here, we observed that even when law-making processes fail in the sense that
they do not lead to the adoption of new laws, they can play a role in increasing de-
mand for private standards. The exclusion of international shipping from the Paris
Agreement on Climate Change was seen by some within the shipping industry as
exacerbating the risk of regional regulation and as a reason for taking stronger
industry-led action and as pushing for more ambitious measures within the IMO.
We also considered the potential for the EU to perform a meta-regulatory func-
tion in relation to private standards as a result of the adoption of EU-MRV. In keep-
ing with this, we consider that the mitigation of GHG emissions from shipping has
the potential to become a site of ‘hybrid’ governance in which private standards and
law interact in a productive way.145
142 Complaints of this kind have been reported within the specialist shipping press and in conversation with
shipping stakeholders.
143 See Lister and others (n 21) and citations therein for literature including shipping examples.
144 There is wide variation in the effectiveness of private standards. Vogel examines case studies of relatively
effective, moderately effective and relatively ineffective ‘civil regulation’; highlighting some of the reasons
for these differences (n 36). See also Axel Marx, Miet Maertens, Johan Swinnen and Jan Wouters (eds),
Private Standards and Global Governance: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives (Edward Elgar 2012).
145 The term hybrid governance can be used to describe different phenomena. Levi-Faur includes different
concepts within this broad category including co-regulation, enforced self-regulation, meta-regulation
and multi-level regulation. We are using the term to refer mainly to meta-regulation but it also captures
the multi-level elements as between the EU and the IMO. See David Levi-Faur, ‘Regulation and
Regulatory Governance’ in David Levi-Faur (ed), Handbook on the Politics of Regulation (Edward
Elgar 2011).
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